A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making
Robin Feldman 1 In recent years, the Supreme Court has agreed to hear a number of cases concerning patentable subject matter. An area that can be both breathtakingly broad and minutely particular, patentable subject matter asks us to consider which innovations are of the type that we might entertain the question of whether they should be granted patent The conversation has the feel of an exchange between a teacher and a student, or perhaps between an adult and an adolescent, because after all, the Federal Circuit has spaces of patentable subject matter that the Supreme Court has engaged in its most detailed conversation yet with the Federal Circuit.
There are those who may argue that judicial decision-making can never be anything but the post-hoc justification of results to which judges are inclined based on their backgrounds and perspectives. I will leave that jurisprudential argument for another day. At the very least, the crafting of reasoned, orderly structures of logic has the potential to create the appearance of fair and rational decision-making and to inspire the confidence upon which the consent of the governed may be based.
From the opposite perspective, to those who may suggest that arguing about whether objectivity in judicial decision-making can exist is passé, a relic of a bygone era, 5 I can only note that I continue to hear the argument raised in conversations among colleagues that in this post-realist world, everyone should know that decision-making is never fully objective, and decision-makers will never escape their biases. I suggest, at the very least again, that even if perfection is not ours to have, we can make considerable progress towards that goal, and we certainly cannot approach it if we do not make a concerted effort.
Encouraging considerable progress may be on the minds of the Justices as well.
Implicit in the Supreme Court's discussion of patentable subject matter, is the message that judicial decision-making can be done better.
In particular, one of the most striking parts of a recent Supreme Court decision on Section 101 of the Patent Code, which is the section on Patentable Subject Matter, occurs when the majority says the following:
Nothing in today's opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of section 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past. 6 In other words, the Supreme Court justices are saying to the Federal Circuit, we disagree with everything you have ever had to say about the topic in your 30-year history. Implicit in such criticism may be the suggestion that the Federal Circuit is going about its work in the wrong way, and this essay will highlight other suggestions in the case law to the same effect.
In short, this essay looks at the way in which the Federal Circuit has been going about its work in patentable subject matter and the criticisms embodied in the Supreme
Court's disapproval of that approach. It also sets out potential approaches to make the content of patentable subject matter jurisprudence consistent with the Supreme Court's desires. Part I of the essay describes recent Supreme Court cases on patentable subject, and those who are familiar with the topic may wish to skip this section. Part II illuminates the underlying conversation between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, describing what the Supreme Court is striving for and the ways in which the Federal Circuit's decision-making falls short. This part also discusses the ways in which the Supreme Court's most recent attempt to demonstrate its jurisprudential approach falls short of its own dictates. Finally, Part III describes an approach to patentable subject matter that solves the devilishly difficult problems in patentable subject matter in a manner that is consistent with the Supreme Court's aspirations.
I. Recent Supreme Court Cases in Patentable Subject Matter
The current morass in patentable subject matter lies at the tangled intersection of computer technology, life sciences, financial services, and the Internet. Just listing the types of inventions involved, not to mention the range of private, commercial, and public interest actors with a stake in the outcome, is enough to give anyone a headache, and the flood of amicus briefs filed with the cases reflects the level of interest and anxiety.
Section 101 of the Patent Act, which is understood to delineate the boundaries of patentable subject matter, notes only that "whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" may obtain a patent.
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Limitations on patentable subject matter have emerged, not from the language of the statute itself, but through case law. Although the words used to describe the categories of things that do not constitute the proper subject matter of a patent have shifted from one Supreme Court case to another, the forbidden categories at various times have included laws of nature, natural phenomena, mathematical formulas, mental steps, and abstract ideas. going about doing something. Language that might limit business method patents, therefore, might also be applied to patents on computer software, which may be expressed in terms of ways of going about getting a machine to do something.
Limitations on business methods might also implicate diagnostic and therapeutic patents in the biotechnology space, which may be expressed as methods of diagnosis and treatment by doing something. Such limitations could also implicate patents on things like genes and antibodies, which, as I will describe below, are a strange combination of a product and a method of going about doing something.
In cases following State Street, the lower courts struggled to establish a test for patentable subject matter that could successfully navigate all of these areas while remaining faithful to the few Supreme Court cases in the arena. The Federal Circuit considered a "physical transformation" test, then tried out a "useful, concrete, and tangible test, and finally moved on to the "machine or transformation test," with none of these remotely capable of addressing the issues in a consistent and comprehensive manner.
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Problems in the area were compounded by the few pronouncements that the Supreme Court had made on the topic. In the late 1970s and early 80s, the Court handed down a series of patentable subject matter cases in an attempt to deal with the strange new worlds of computers and genetic engineering. Reflecting deep divisions among the Justices, the decisions were less than a model of clarity, and the Court retreated into silence on the issue, for decades.
13 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ; In re Alappat 33 F.3d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994 . For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of these tests, see FELDMAN, supra note 9.
The following discussion will describe those cases from the 1970s and 1980s, and explain the lack of clarity for the lower courts. Specifically, in the biotechnology arena, Court in Flook rejected a patent on a process for programing an alarm to signal that the conversion is reaching a danger point, so that the engine could suspend the conversion at the optimal time. The process used a computer formula and a set of steps to constantly recalculate the proper moment to trigger the alarm based on a series of changing factors.
The Court in Flook decided that the formula in the process was a computer algorithm. The court then ruled that a computer algorithm is analogous to a mathematical formula or a law of nature, and that as such, it falls outside patentable subject matter.
Given that all the other elements of the process were well known, and the Court had ruled the algorithm unpatentable, the Court rejected the patent. Justice Stephens authored the opinion. In Diehr, the patent holder claimed the process of constantly measuring the actual temperature inside a rubber-curing mold and feeding those measurements into a computer that would use a formula to repeatedly recalculate the time limit for the mold to be opened. The majority found the invention patentable, deciding that although the invention included an equation, the inventors were merely patenting a process for curing rubber, rather than trying to patent an equation itself.
An endless stream of commentators have noted that the inventions were quite similar, a similarity that I would describe in the following manner: Diehr was a process for updating the moment that rubber-curing should end, using a computerized formula and a set of steps to constantly recalculate the relevant moment to open the mold, based on a series of changing factors. Flook was a process for updating the moment that catalytic conversion should end, using a computerized formula and a set of steps to constantly recalculate the relevant moment, based on a series of changing factors.
Expressed in terms like these, the inventions are strikingly similar. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the patent in Diehr, concluding that it was a different kind of invention from the one denied in Flook. The Court characterized the invention in Diehr as "an improved process for molding rubber articles" while it described the Flook invention as nothing more than a formula for computing a number.
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The Federal Circuit later extended the logic of the Diehr opinion to cover not only computer programs imbedded in industrial machinery, but also computer programs standing alone. The Supreme Court, however, would say nothing further on patentable subject matter for the next 24 years.
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The Supreme Court's first modern indication of its interest in patentable subject matter cases appeared in an aborted attempt to address the issue in 2005 by granting certiorari in the case of LabCorp v. Metabolite. 24 The patent in LabCorp revolved around homocysteine, an amino acid that is produced through natural processes in the human body. 25 For more than 50 years, doctors have known that high levels of homocysteine are associated with numerous serious health problems, but the reasons for that connection remain unclear. The patent holders were able to figure out a piece of that illusive connection by determining that high levels of total homocysteine are indicative of deficiencies in folic acid and vitamin B12. Doctors already knew that deficiencies in folic acid and B12 could be linked to serious health problems. In particular, pregnant woman who lack sufficient amounts of folic acid in their system run a far greater risk of delivering a baby with the severe birth defect spina bifida. Measuring folic acid and B12 in the body, however, is difficult. Thus, finding a correlation between high homocysteine levels, which we can measure in the blood, and deficiencies in folic acid and B12, allowed doctors to search for these vitamin deficiencies indirectly by measuring total homocysteine in the blood.
The accused infringer filed for certiorari on issues related to patentable subject matter, arguing that the patent holder was trying to claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship. 26 Perhaps anticipating the firestorm that would emerge, the Solicitor General's office recommended against taking the case, suggesting that the issues necessary to address the question had not been fully argued below. In particular, the Solicitor General noted pointedly that, "if this Court were to consider reevaluating almost a quarter-century of administrative practice and lower court jurisprudence, it should do so based on a full record." The three dissenting Justices saw sufficient information in the record to deny patentability to the invention as falling outside the scope of patentable subject matter.
Specifically, the Justices argued that the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency constitutes no more than a natural phenomenon.
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Perhaps the most interesting sections of the dissent can be found in the Justices' discussion of why they felt their brethren should not have dismissed the case. The 34 The patent at issue in Prometheus concerned methods for calibrating the proper dosage of a certain category of medicines for gastrointestinal disorders. The method involved administering the drug to a patient, determining the level of the drug's metabolites in the patient's system, and then correlating that with ranges that the inventor had determined to decide whether the drug needed to be increased of decreased.
In upholding the patent, the Federal Circuit used a remarkably flexible interpretation of the notion of "transformation" in its machine-or-transformation test.
Prior to ', the Federal Circuit had described the transformation prong of the test as considering whether the invention "transforms" a particular article into a different state or thing. In other words, one of two ways the court could ensure that the patent holder was claiming an applied art rather than an abstraction or a law of nature, would be if the invention transformed an article into something different. This notion fit well with the Supreme Court's suggestion that the rubber-curing invention in Diehr was proper, as well as other historic cases. There, one could clearly see an industrial process transforming ingredients into perfectly molded rubber.
In Prometheus, however, the Federal Circuit applied a far more expansive notion of "transformation," and one that arguably stretched it to the breaking point. The Federal Circuit found that the invention constituted transformation because the drugs were transformed as they were metabolized in the patient's body and the patient' about; we will get this right," was the implicit message.
A test that simply swept in all inventions in the life sciences had the virtue of protecting innovations in this important arena, but it came at the price of defensible logic.
How could the test offer courts the ability to clearly differentiate between patentable and nonpatentable subject matter if it could be molded so drastically in different circumstances. As one would see across time, the Prometheus plea would be insufficient to save either the machine-or-transformation test or the invention in Prometheus.
Returning to the Bilski case, which was still pending when the Perhaps the only clear messages to emerge from the Bilski opinion were the following: First, the notion of pre-emption would be key to any determinations in patentable subject matter. The Court's core concern revolved around whether granting the patent at issue would pre-empt or block out an entire abstract idea. Second, the Supreme Court disapproved of everything that the Federal Circuit has said in this arena, which is evident from the striking quote discussed above. In surprising contrast to the divided opinions of Bilski, the decision in Prometheus was unanimous. The unanimity of the court, as well as authorship of the opinion by Justice Breyer, could suggest that Prometheus was the case Justice Breyer had been waiting, and preparing his colleagues for, since his original shot across the bow in
LabCorp. Both of the cases concern approaches to diagnosing and treating a patient based on correlations that the inventor had developed between the level of certain substances in the blood and the patient's disease state. Broadly speaking, both are examples of the emerging field of personalized medicine, which I will discuss further below.
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Mayo v. Prometheus opens with a discussion of the Court's prior decisions in patentable subject matter. It reads almost like a tutorial-one on putting together a group of cases to form a coherent doctrinal path or a brief to an appellate court. Of particular note in the opening section is the Court's admonition that patent eligibility cannot "depend simply on the draftsman's art." 40 The
Court also characterizes its prior precedents as warning against upholding process patents that preempt the use of a natural law. 41 These precedents, explains the Court, insist that process claims contain some inventive concept sufficient to ensure that the patent amounts to significantly more than a patent on the natural law itself.
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The Court found that the range of levels at which a particular drug's metabolite would indicate a need for more or less medication should be considered a natural law.
Therefore, upholding the patent would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the natural law. 43 In addition, outside of the part of the patent that had now been found to constitute a natural law, the Court found that the invention consisted of no more than well-known, routine steps.
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Regarding the machine-or-transformation test, the Court disagreed both with the result that the Federal Circuit reached in applying the test, but also with the Federal Circuit's decision under the circumstances to apply the test at all. First, the Supreme Court explained that the invention would not satisfy the transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation test because the types of transformation identified by the Federal Circuit in the case were insufficient. 45 On the Federal Circuit's notion of transforming the patient by administering the drug, the Supreme Court found that such activity is "irrelevant" to the transformation question. 46 Rather, the Supreme Court focused on the "administering" aspect of the activity and argued that administering the drug involved no more than helping to "pick out the group of individuals . . . interested in applying the law of nature. 47 Although the opinion does not specify, the Justices appeared to be thinking of the patients taking the drug as being the individuals applying the law of nature. At other places in the opinion, the Justices suggest that the doctors, rather than the patients, are the relevant audience interested in applying the law of nature. 48 Thinking of doctors, who are practicing their scientific craft, as the audience interested in applying the law of nature more sense intuitively than the notion of the patient as the one applying the law of nature. The latter conjures up the notion of patients treating themselves.
On the Federal Circuit's suggestion that the "transformation" also occurs because the blood sample necessarily is transformed in the process of testing it to determine the metabolite level, the Supreme Court ruled that this step has the potential to be satisfied It is as if the Court is saying to the Federal Circuit, "you are not asking the questions right. Yes, you have a piece of the puzzle, but there is a problem with your use of proxies (such as machine-or-transformation; useful, concrete, and tangible, etc.) It isn't that everything embodied in the proxy is wrong, the problem is that you are forgetting what the proxies are testing for and allowing the proxies to take on a life of their own."
In the second strand of the message, the Supreme Court takes aim at the Federal Circuit's willingness to drift unmoored from precedent-be it legislative or judicial. On the issue of fidelity to legislative language, the Supreme Court chides the Federal Circuit, arguing that adopting machine-or-transformation as the sole test for patentable subject matter for process patents would violate principles of statutory interpretation. 55 The Court points out that the Patent Act specifically defines the term "process" to mean "process, Although there are multiple causes for the Federal Circuit's difficulties, to some extent, the problems reflect the Federal Circuit's tolerance for discordance. This is apparent both procedurally, in terms of not cleaning up its own deviations, and substantively, in terms of doctrinal areas that do not work together as a logical whole.
The notion of discordance leads to the third and most important strand in the Supreme
Court's message to the Federal Circuit. One could describe this line of complaint as related to logical coherence.
As described in Part I, the Federal Circuit all too frequently is drawn towards doctrinal rules that resolve the issue of the moment but lack general applicability and logical coherence. The approach feels comfortable, because the outcome of the case is acceptable, but the resulting doctrines are intellectually and operationally unsatisfying. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit reaffirms the test, making a small adjustment to resolve the immediate problems, creating ever more inconsistency and unworkable logic throughout the doctrine.
In response, the Supreme Court's opinion in Prometheus is rife with language pushing the Federal Circuit towards improving its doctrinal approach. says that it wants to see "practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort" and later when the Court complains about patent language that has the effect of "simply appending conventional steps specified at a high level of generality," the Court is partly speaking to the patent bar about the documents it has drafted. The Court also, however, appears to be speaking to the Federal Circuit, suggesting that it must straighten up the mess that its decisions have wrought.
One could characterize the Supreme Court's pronouncements as a preference for flexible standards rather than bright-line rules. 67 The Supreme Court certainly has rejected the bright-line approaches, such as machine-or-transformation and concrete/useful/tangible, which the Federal Circuit has offered. My own view is that the Supreme Court's decisions are an encouragement towards systems of more comprehensive logic. The Court is not saying you may not have bright-line rules, it is saying you cannot have rules of convenience-ones that have so little coherence at their core that they can be manipulated to reach any result.
Perhaps it is not surprising to see a court of specialization relying on minute distinctions of questionable value, particularly a court with science as its domain. In many circumstances, courts have manifested the irresistible urge to deflect difficult decisions by cloaking themselves in a veil of scientific distinctions, regardless of whether those distinctions speak to the legal issue at hand. 68 With a court of specialization, buffered by speaking its own dialect and isolated from the more frequent channels of 67 See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 35 (describing the Federal Circuits approach in patentable subject matter as characteristic of bright-line rules with the Supreme Court's approach expressing a preference for flexible standards Court tries to demonstrate the outlines of a test for patentable subject matter, the Court runs into its own problems in trying to construct a framework of general applicability that displays logical consistency. In an effort to draw together the precedents in patentable subject matter to form the basis of a coherent approach, the Court stumbles when it insists on preserving both the Flook and the Diehr opinions and trying to articulate a principled distinction between the two.
As described above, the two cases really are quite difficult to distinguish. First we have Diehr:
a process for updating the moment that rubber curing should end, using a computerized formula and a set of steps to constantly recalculate the relevant moment, based on a series of changing factors.
With remarkable similarity we have Flook:
69 See id. at 193 (describing problems at the Federal Circuit as structurally predictable as explained in the remainder of the paragraph in the text above).
a process for updating the moment that catalytic conversion should end, using a computerized formula and a set of steps to constantly recalculate the relevant moment, based on a series of changing factors. that some will pass muster. Nevertheless, looking at the Court's distain in Prometheus for "conventional steps specified at a high level of generality" I would be very worried if I were a software maker. The phrase "Conventional steps specified at a high level of generality" could describe many software patents that have been issued by the PTO across time. As noted above, I would predict that Association for Medical Pathology and one yet-to-be-determined case on software patents are likely to form the third and fourth legs of the court's table in this realm.
IV. Finding the Solution
In anticipation of the further conversation ahead, this section suggests a doctrinal approach to provide logical coherence throughout patentable subject matter. The approach also has the potential for harmonizing, to the greatest extent possible, the Supreme Court's past precedents.
Much of this essay has focused on process patents, that is, patents on a process of doing something. Patent courts and commentators generally divide inventions into two separate types: 1) patents on processes and 2) patents on products. I would argue, however, that everything in the world of innovation does not fall so neatly into those two categories.
Consider genes, for example. Patents on gene sequences are treated as product patents, and genetic material in a laboratory petri dish is certainly as tangible as any drop of chemical in that dish would be. Nevertheless, genes are a strange type of product.
Human genes are literally a sequence of nucleotides that operate as a set of instructions for carrying out some function in the human body. 73 Normally, a set of instructions is considered a process, rather than a product, but once again, genes are as tangible as any product one might create.
It takes a certain amount of mental gymnastics to contemplate a thing whose nature combines both product and process. If one could create an instruction manual that operated on its own, for example, would it be a process or a product? One could argue that software, to some extent, is an example of another hybrid of this kind. Software itself could be thought of as a set of instructions. It is a set of instructions, however, that is designed to operate itself, that is, to produce a set of results.
It is possible that within this strange world of hybrids, in fact, at the intersection of biology and software, one could find a solution to patentable subject matter.
Personalized medicine actually falls at this intersection, and inventions in the field may offer a road map for a solution. Although the Supreme Court did not find patentability in the personalized medicine invention of Prometheus, more sophisticated personalized medicine inventions may pass muster. In addition, the marriage of biology and software is the perfect opportunity to highlight where the law has gone off course in patentable subject matter and how to fix the problem.
A key aspect of the problem unfolded as computer and software inventors in the 1980s tried to figure out how to craft claims that the Supreme Court would be willing to 73 For a more complete discussion of genes in this manner, an in-depth discussion of possible solutions in the Association for Molecular Pathology case, and additional discussion of the personalized medicine concepts raised here, The patent system continues to strain under this legacy. Consider for example a recent patent on a user interface. The language in the following sentence is the actual claims language from the patent. 75 The patent claims a monitor, a memory, and a transmitter and a processor configured to: monitor a product for a predefined trigger event, increment a counter, cause the display of a user interface, and if the counter exceeds a threshold, cause the memory to store an input received from the interface and cause the transmitted to transmit the input to a server.
This language in this patent is incredibly broad. The point is that using simple
prose to describe what a computer is accomplishing has the effect of granting a huge swath of territory to the inventor, with the potential to reach well beyond what the inventor actually has accomplished up to that point. Such is the legacy of our aversion to math. 76 See Feldman, Whose Body Is It Anyway, supra note 34, at 1400-1401 (using the bridge building example).
In computer science, an algorithm is defined as a series of steps performed on input data by a computer. 77 A series of steps performed on input data by a computer will raise pre-emption concerns in some circumstances and not in others. One must know much more about a computer program-beyond the term "algorithm"-to determine whether granting a patent on the program would result in pre-emption problems. For example, some computer algorithms are based on properties of particular types of data.
This sort of algorithm, one that can be used on a variety of types of data, threatens to create pre-emption problems. If we are asked to grant a patent on a software program that works with entire sets of numbers or types of data, we should have concerns about the breadth of inventions that would be blocked out as a result. In contrast, a computer algorithm applied to a specific type of input data in an effort to reach specific types of output data would not raise the same pre-emption concerns.
As long as the patent system's approach to software revolves around broad, prose
language descriptions of what the software does, field of use restrictions will remain the most effective way to ensure that inventors are limiting their patents to a particular application of natural laws. At its core, this is the distinction that the Supreme Court is struggling to make out of Flook and Diehr. The Court's decisions in these two cases can be characterized as focusing on whether the inventor was trying to claim a type of computer program in general, rather than a specific application and a specific way to apply the type of program.
77 See FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW, 132-134 (describing algorithms and expanding on the concepts briefly discussed here concerning how different types of algorithms raise differing levels of pre-emption concerns).
In perfect candor, a completely satisfying resolution of Flook and Diehr would benefit from an acknowledgment that while the expressions of the claims, and the discussion of their preemption risks diverged, the facts of the two cases were quite similar. Sections of Flook are simply incompatible with the decision in Diehr, and one court argue that the court would be better served by retreating from its first, and perhaps imperfect, foray into computer-related inventions in Flook.
In my view, the proper test for determining patentable subject matter should focus both on pre-emption and on the tests for patentability as a whole. I would express the basic inquiry in the following manner: Considering the limitations of the patent system as a whole, are we likely to have preemption problems with the subject matter of this alone the state of nature as a whole. They are not merely reflections of nature; they are interpretive models of nature.
Properly drawn, claims to the type of complex, personalized medicine invention described here would leave plenty of room for the development of competing models of nature, even competing models relating to that particular disease state. Thus, they should not raise the same types of pre-emption concerns.
As described above, a computer algorithm applied to a specific type of input data in an effort to reach specific types of output data should not raise pre-emption concerns.
Similarly, a bioinformatics statistical model using a fixed set of markers to produce a specific diagnosis would not threaten to pre-empt the same diagnosis using different In short, the Supreme Court is already deep into its conversation with the Federal Circuit, and it has so much more to say. Analyzing the issues as described above could help rationalize the Supreme Court's various forays into the world of computer-related inventions, as well as creating a doctrinal structure applicable across all areas of patentable subject matter with logical consistency.
